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Abstract
We formalize Abadi and Rogaway's computational soundness result in the Coq interac-
tive theorem prover. This requires to model notions of provable cryptography like indistin-
guishability between ensembles of probability distributions, PPT reductions, and security
notions for encryption schemes. Our formalization is the rst computational soundness re-
sult to be mechanized, and it shows the feasibility of rigorous reasoning of computational
cryptography inside a generic interactive theorem prover.
1 Introduction
Usually, it is necessary to adopt an abstract view of cryptographic operations to make the
design and analysis of cryptographic protocols more manageable. Two different, but still
related abstract views of cryptographic operations the formal and the computational have
developed separately in the last years. In the former, the exchanged messages of the protocol
are modelled as formal expressions of a term algebra. The (cryptographic) operations, such
as message pairing and encryption, are modelled as term constructors. In this setting, an
adversary and its abilities can be modelled in terms of the messages the adversary knows. On
the other hand, in the computational model, messages are considered to be (more realistically)
bit-strings, while cryptographic operations are seen as functions over these bit-strings. Here,
an adversary is modelled as any efcient algorithm.
Both of the two above models have advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the
formal model allows to reason about cryptographic protocols more easily and generally. How-
ever, such benets arise from the adoption of fairly strong assumptions (such as freeness of the
term algebra, and xing the adversary model). On the other hand, the computational model,
by considering messages as bit-strings and modelling the adversary as any efcient algorithm,
provides a more realistic model and thus offers more convincing security guarantees. How-
ever, proving protocols correct in the computational model is more difcult and less general
than in the formal model.
In the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway [4], it is shown that if two formal expres-
sions are similar to a formal adversary, then their corresponding computational interpreta-
tions, represented as bit-strings in the computational model, are also indistinguishable to any
computational adversary (computational soundness). This result comprises a very important
(rst) step into relating the formal and computational model, and was followed by several
others [3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 11].
Computational soundness theorems are of great value because they simplify the analysis of
a given protocol, since we only need to full the formal requirements (which can be handled
automatically in several cases) to obtain strong computational results. Moreover, computa-
tional soundness results can be proved once and for all, independently of the actual protocol
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under analysis. However, this also means that soundness results are critical, and need to be not
only correct but also clear and precise, so that we can have full understanding and condence
on our protocol analysis. Hence, soundness results are particularly attractive for rigorous for-
malization in a prover. In this paper we provide such a formalization for Abadi and Rogaway's
computational soundness result in the Coq interactive theorem prover [2]. Our choice of proof
assistant is based on the fact that Coq is both quite suitable for (1) manipulating (inductive)
datatypes for terms and (xpoint) functions that compute on them and (2) dening precisely
the computational model, including PPT reductions, indistinguishability, and security notions
for encryption schemes.
Related Work. Work on formalization in interactive theorem provers started in the sym-
bolic setting by Paulson [13]. Tarento et al. formalized in Coq models for the Generic and
Random Oracle models [5] (but did not focus on PPT reduction-based proofs). Recently,
Sprenger et al. developed a BPW model in Isabelle/HOL [14] (although this work does not
formalize BRSIM/UC cryptographic soundness).
In recent work [8], we considered a Probabilistic Hoare-style logic that can be used to
describe game-based cryptographic proofs, and illustrated our technique by proving semantic
security of ElGamal. The work presented in this paper can be seen as preparing the ground
for formalizing this kind of approaches, by exploring the formalization of core concepts of
provable cryptography inside a proof assistant like Coq.
In contrast to applying soundness results from formal to computational settings, Blanchet
has recently proposed a protocol verier called CryptoVerif [7] that directly works in a compu-
tational setting. In contrast to soundness settings where the security of operations is built-in
(e.g., type-0 for symmetric encryption in this paper), CryptoVerif is more exible in that one
can ne-tune the security notion that a given cryptographic operation has. Of course, this extra
control may not be always needed, and it does not come for free as CryptoVerif may in some
cases require manual guidance.
The paper is structured as follows. The formal view is presented in the next section.
Section 3 presents the computational model. Section 4 describes the soundness proof. We
conclude in Section 5, with some conclusions learnt by doing this proof and some hopes for
the future. A more detailed version of this paper, including Coq proofs, is available [1].
2 Formal View
In the following we illustrate our formalization using (straightforward) excerpts of Coq code.
We start with the denition of formal expressions, i.e. terms that are dened using the follow-
ing inductive datatype.
Inductive term : Type :=
j Bit : N ! term
j Key : N ! term
j Pair : term ! term ! term
j Enc : N ! term ! term
j Un : term.
Bits and keys use natural numbers as labels. We include the undecryptable , here called Un.
For example, terms m0 = Pair (Key 1) (Enc 1 (Bit 1)) and m1 = Pair (Key 1) (Enc 2 (Bit 1))
represent the concatenation of key K1 with the encryption of bit 1 under key K1 and K2,
respectively.
We dene functions for obtaining the recoverable, hidden keys, and entailment, as usual.
Following [4], the p function inputs a term m and a sequence of keys ks and computes the
pattern, presented below. We also dene the equivalences  and  (called sequiv and equiv).
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Fixpoint p (m:term) (ks: seq N ) : term :=
match m with
j Un )Un
j Bit b )Bit b
j Key k )Key k
j Pair t1 t2 )Pair (p t1 ks) (p t2 ks)
j Enc k1 t1 ) if mem ks k1 then Enc k1 (p t1 ks) else Un
end.
Denition pattern (m: term) :term := p m (recoverable m).
Denition sequiv (m0 m1 : term) : Prop := pattern m0 = pattern m1 .
Denition equiv (m0 m1 : term) : Prop := 9 ff , perm ff ^ sequiv m0 (subst m1 ff ).
(Here, predicate mem ks k1 tests membership of k1 in ks, perm ff holds iff ff is a permutation
on keys, and subst applies a substitution to a term.) For example, for m0 and m1 above we
have pattern m0 = m0 and pattern m1 = (Key 1, Un), and hence we can prove they are not
equivalent. In the soundness proof, we assume given a permutation renaming : term ! term
that reindexes keys s.t. keys with greater indexes always encrypt keys with smaller indexes
(in [4] this is the `prime' renaming reindexing fromM;N toM 0; N 0). We also assume given a
function ki: term ! N ! N which returns the i-th indexed key in renaming m, and a function
ks: term ! N ! (seq N ) which returns the sequence of keys indexed from 1 to i  1.
3 Computational Model
In order to carry out the soundness proof, we rst formalize some notions of provable cryp-
tography.
Basic notions Randomness is modelled by using coins, elements of a nite type C1. Each
coin is in turn an innite stream that can be shifted to a new position (thus obtaining a
new coin, denoted cn for shifting c to position n) or projected (thus obtaining random-
ness that algorithms can use). We assume xed an ensemble over coins (i.e., a family
of probability distributions) fPrg, indexed by security parameters  2 N, from coins
to the [0; 1] real interval. Using this ensemble, we dene in Coq a function that calcu-
lates the probability of a predicate P : C ! bool, denoted as Pr[P ], which sums the
probabilities Pr(c) for each coin c s.t. P c holds.
Symmetric Encryption A scheme sch consists of a triple of algorithms G;E;D, for key
generation (of type N !C !BS, where BS are nite sequences of bits), encryption
( C !BS !BS !BS), and decryption (BS ! BS ! BS). In addition, we model
a number of functional properties (e.g., that decryption inverses encryption), although
they are not required by the soundness proof.
Adversaries An adversary A is a Coq function of type TA := C !BS !BS. We assume
given a predicate testing whether an adversary is PPT, called PPT : TA ! bool.
PPT reductions Reductions in which an adversary A0 is built out of another A are common
in provable cryptography, where it is usually shown that if A is PPT then A0 is also
PPT. We rigorously model this as follows. Given a seed consisting of an adversary A, a
scheme sch, and oracles o1; o2 (all assumed to be PPT), we build a family of extended
adversaries F (A; sch; o1; o2), i.e. functions that compute on their own and may call A,
the oracles o1; o2 or the encryption scheme sch at some point. Extended adversaries
1The size of C can be made to depend on the security parameter  (e.g., polynomially large in ).
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can be built out of simpler extended adversaries by using conditionals, sequential
composition, and term recursion (but not unbounded computations like using a `while'
command). Crucially, given a Coq proof of A0 2 F (A; sch; o1; o2), we can easily mea-
sure the number of execution steps done by A0 (using a simple function countSteps)
before it callsA or oi; we can then bound the steps ofA
0 by a polynomial in the security
parameter, establishing the reduction to be PPT2.
Indistinguishability & Type-0 We dene negligibility of functions as usual. Let zero denote
the empty bitstring. Given an ensemble over coins fPrg, an adversary A, and a family
of functions fDg from coins to bitstrings, we let functionPr[A(cn; D(c)) == zero]
denote the resulting probability ofA recognizing distributionD (by outputting zero)
for security parameter , starting at cn; for each c s.t. A(cn; D(c)) returns zero, we
add the probability Pr(c). Indistinguishability between two distributions D and D
0
 ,
given by predicate indistinguishable D D', holds when the difference function
Pr[A(cn; D(c)) = zero]  Pr[A(cn; D
0
(c)) = zero]
is a negligible function in  for every A s.t. PPT  A. Here, n  0 is a `shift' parameter
telling in which position can A start using its randomness (i.e., at cn, but not before);
this allowsD to use private randomness (starting in c0 until cn 1) which is hidden from
A. In the soundness proof, for terms M and N we let D = [[M ]], D0 = [[N ]] and n is
the number of encryptions and keys inM and N (given by function shf N M).
Type-0 security is dened analogously, although now no input is directly given to the
attacker (in contrast to indistinguishability above in which A is given D(c)). Rather,
oracles get instantiated differently in the left and right instances, and the role of A is
now to guess to which oracles it is speaking to. Given two extended adversaries A0,
A0
0
, we dene a Coq predicate same up to oracles which takes two proofs of A0 2
F (A; sch; o1; o2) and A
0
0
2 F (A; sch; o0
1
; o0
2
) that holds iff A0 is the exactly the same
adversary as A0
0
, except that when A0 calls oi, A
0
0
calls o0i. We can now dene type-0
security of a scheme sch of algorithms G;E;D, given by predicate type0scheme sch,
which holds when the difference function
Pr[A0(cn; zero) = zero]  Pr[A
0
0
(cn; zero) = zero]
is negligible in  for every A0 and A
0
0
same up to oracles, extensions of A using real
and fake oracles, respectively (formally,A0 2 F (A; sch;E(G(c0); ); E(G(c1); ))
and A0
0
2 F (A; sch;E(G(c0); zero); E(G(c0); zero))), where G and E are the key
generation and encryption functions of scheme sch.
Note here that c0 is used to generate the left key of the oracles, and c1 is the right key of
only the left real oracle. Adversaries A0 and A
0
0
are given cn (for n  2) to avoid the
attacker from knowing c0 and c1 trivially. Type-1, 2, and 3 can be dened analogously.
These notions are in fact generic in provable cryptography, and could be used in other
developments; they are not specic to the soundness proof, which we elaborate next.
4 Soundness
We dene a function from terms to bitstrings called convert. A call to convert index m, denoted
[[m]] index, returns a mapping that given a security parameter  and a coin c converts term m to
a bitstring, using the encryption scheme sch instantiated by the security parameter , starting
from cindex. We are now ready to state the soundness theorem:
2In fact, since (the number of instructions of) extended adversaries do not depend on , we could prove the whole
family to be PPT directly.
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Theorem soundness : 8 (M N:term), M  N ! type0scheme sch !
indistinguishable ([[M]] (shf N M)) ([[N]] (shf N M)).
For any two formally equivalent terms M and N, if sch is type-0 then the bitstrings generated
by [[]] on M and N (starting from randomness shf N M) are computationally indistinguishable.
In the proof, following [4], we reason by contradiction and assume an adversary A which
violates indistinguishability of M and N . We then build two extended adversaries A0 2
F (A; sch;E(G(c0); ); E(G(c1); )) andA
0
0
2 F (A; sch;E(G(c0); zero); E(G(c0); zero))
and prove (1) they are the same up to oracles, and (2) they are PPT, if A is PPT. Then we nd
a `large gap' i between [[Mi]] and [[Mi 1]], (where Mi denotes the term p M' fK1; : : : ;Kig,
for M' being (renaming M) andK1; : : : ;Ki given by ks M i), and prove
Pr[A0(cn; zero) = zero] = Pr[A(cn; [[Mi]](c))]
Pr[A
0
0
(cn; zero) = zero] = Pr[A(cn; [[Mi 1]](c))]
This crucial step is rigorously proved in our development by using two intermediate lemmas
proving that Pr[] commutes with (1) substitutions (of renaming) and with (2) patterns p.
These lemmas also help into understanding exactly when the property of `renaming' is used.
Finally, our formalized proof was also useful to detect some bad usages of the p function when
called with incomplete keys (e.g., as in M := (fK1gK2 ; f58gK1), where a call p M K2 =
(fK1gK2 ;) should be avoided) if one attempts to deviate from the original proof [4].
5 Conclusions
This development shows the feasibility of formalizing cryptographic soundness results in a
general purpose interactive theorem prover like Coq. Moreover, we obtained deep insight into
the original, soundness paper-based proof, as well as developed provable cryptographic con-
cepts that can be useful in other cryptographic formalizations, e.g. to build tools for checking
game-based cryptographic proofs [8].
Future Work. We already started developing the converse to the soundness theorem, i.e.
completeness [11]. In fact this theorem seems easier than the soundness one of this paper, as
it involves no reduction, only bitstrings computations and inductive proofs that can be easily
dealt with in Coq. Another goal is to model a richer language (in the lines of [3]), or to
formalize soundness in an active setting [12]. This would require us to model stateful oracles
(i.e. to model protocol participants). This can be done in the current setting e.g. encoding
the state as a value piggybacked to the attacker, which needs to return it in every oracle
invocation.
Coq statistics. Besides the soundness theorem, there are 98 denitions and 65 lemmas in
2853 lines of code. We use Coq 8.0 with ssreect from G. Gonthier.
Acknowledgements. M. Abadi, C. Fournet, A. Mahboubi, G. Gonthier, E. Tassi, G. Barthe,
S. Zanella, R. Janvier, B. Gregoire, J. den Hartog, and P. van Rossum provided useful remarks.
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